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Editor's Note: This Article was originally written as a set of recommen-
dations for the Texas Democratic Party to achieve more statewide success
by engaging the largely Hispanic region of South Texas. As a nonpartisan
law review, The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues does
not necessarily endorse the partisan views espoused by the authors.
Though the recommendations are politically biased, the lessons learned
by examining this region demonstrate that legal barriers and entrenched
political structures have implications for minorities that extend beyond
partisan politics.
"The Valley' is poised to elect the next governor if we get our act together
here. 2
1. "The Valley" refers to the northern Rio Grande valley, or the region otherwise
known as South Texas.
2. Telephone Interview with Nathan Seizer, Project Coordinator, Mi Familia Vota
(Feb. 24, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues). Mi
Familia Vota is a national organization that works to encourage civic engagement and vot-
ing in Hispanic communities. About Us-Mi Familia Vota, http://mifamiliavota.net/about
(last visted Apr. 9, 2010).
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"[Republicans] don't need [the South Texas] vote to win, Democrats
do. ,3
I. INTRODUCTION
Voter turnout in South Texas 4 is consistently lower than the state aver-
age in general elections. 5 In 2008, despite record turnout, South Texas
fell behind the state average by over sixteen percentage points.6 For the
Texas Democratic Party (TDP), the ability to win statewide elections
hinges on the ability to raise turnout in this region, where over eighty
percent of the citizens are Hispanic7 and where over sixty-nine percent of
the population voted for Obama in the 2008 general election.8
We find that low general election turnout primarily stems from two
sources: a lack of local competitive races in general elections and the
dominance of political factions in the region. A lack of local competitive
races in general elections (as opposed to primaries) reduces incentives for
3. Interview with Matt Angle, Dir., The Lone Star Project (Dec. 20, 2008) (on file with
The Scholar. St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues). Matt Angle created the Lone
Star Project in 2005 to "serve as a fact-checker on the Republican Party on both the state
and national levels." About Us. The Lone Star Project, http://www.lonestarproject.net/
about.html#AbouttheLoneStarProject (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). "'My belief was that-
particularly in Texas-you had a situation where you had the Republican leaders failing,'
said Angle. '[They were] not just failing as political leaders but as leaders generally. My
thought was to not just complain but to show people exactly why there was a problem."'
Id. (alteration in original).
4. In this Article, voter turnout in South Texas is determined for each election by
dividing the number of total votes cast in all twelve counties (Brooks, Cameron, Dimmit,
Duval, Hidalgo, Jim Hogg, Maverick, Starr, Webb, Willacy, Zapata, and Zavala) by the
number of registered voters in all twelve counties and multiplying that number by 100.
Many political scientists determine voter turnout in a similar manner. See, e.g., Louis
DESIrio, COUNTING ON THE LATINO VOTE: LATINOS AS A NEW ELECIrORATE 89 & tbl.4.i
(1996); Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., Inequalities of Political Voice, in INEQUALITY AN[)
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAr WE NEED ro LEARN 19, 33 &
tbl.2.1 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005). When measuring voter turnout,
we consider only those who are registered.
5. Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back, TEX. OBSERVER, Mar. 21, 2008, at 20, availa-
ble at 2008 WLNR 7075417 ("[Historically low voter turnout in general elections doomed
South Texas to a disproportionately small cache of [Democratic caucus] delegates.").
6. Office of the Secretary of State, http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select
"County by County Canvass Report" radio button; select "2008 General Election" from
the drop-down menu and click "Submit": then select "President/Vice-President" from the
drop-down menu and click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
7. Demographics-South Texas, http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/tif/south
texas/demographics.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
8. Office of the Secretary of State, http:llelections.sos.state.tx.uslelchist.exe (select
"County by County Canvass Report" radio button; select "2008 General Election" from
the drop-down menu and click "Submit"; then select "President/Vice-President" from the
drop-down menu and click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
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political actors, like campaign operatives and party leaders, to contact
voters and results in lackluster voter motivation. Because many local
elections are settled in the primaries, political actors often have nothing
to lose by doing nothing in the general elections.9 Entrenched political
factions within the Democratic Party and a tradition of paid political op-
eratives also result in less voter contact, as well as poor campaign coordi-
nation and a lack of volunteerism. These problems cause incentive
structures that do a major disservice to the TDP."'
In addition, voter turnout in South Texas is threatened by state legisla-
tive proposals that will likely inhibit Hispanic voters' ability to turn out at
the polls. One bill left pending in the Texas House of Representatives
would require all voters to present photo ID at the polling place, a re-
quirement that would unduly burden immigrants and other low-income
Hispanic voters in South Texas. 1" A second bill would prohibit the use of
government funds to print bilingual election materials for Spanish-only
voters.' 2 If passed, these bills will impose legal limitations upon a region
already struggling to overcome political and cultural barriers to voter
turnout.
Because these problems concern political actors more than voters,
Steven J. Rosenstone's and John Mark Hansen's work, which suggests
that people do not vote, in large part, because political actors do not ask
them to, 13 is particularly relevant. This theory, reflected in the barriers
we identify, can explain much of the turnout problem in South Texas gen-
eral elections. Other impediments to voting, like a lack of resources in
the region, complicated voting logistics, and more traditionally empha-
sized barriers to turnout (such as socioeconomic status) also contribute to
low turnout.' 4 However, in light of the region's exceptionally high per-
formance in primary elections,' 5 where incentive structures and competi-
9. Cf. Tex. Sen. Eddie Lucio, Jr., Letter to the Editor, Let's Raise South Texas Voter
Turnout, BROWNSVILLE HEARALD, Jan. 26, 2010, available at http://www.brownsvilleher-
ald.com/articles/voter-107874-let-raise.html (noting relatively low voter turnout in general
elections in South Texas).
10. Jazmine Ulloa, Democratic Candidates Answer Key Questions on Their Platforms
at UTB-TSC Forum, BROWNSVILLE HERALD, Feb. 17, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR
3341894. "The Rio Grande Valley is critically important to my campaign," said former
Houston Mayor and current Democratic nominee for Governor of Texas, Bill White. Id.
11. Tex. S.B. 362, 81st Leg.. R.S. (2009).
12. Tex. H.B. 81, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
13. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION,
ANI) DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 161 (1993) ("People participate in electoral politics be-
cause someone encourages or inspires them to take part.").
14. Id. at 133-44.
15. South Texas voters vote in the Democratic primary in numbers dramatically
higher than the rest of the state-22.73% versus 9.5% statewide in 1996; 21.39% versus
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tion operate well, we argue that these typically cited problems cannot on
their own explain low voter turnout in general elections.
Our recommendations section proposes specific strategies to increase
turnout in South Texas and make Texas Democrats more competitive in
statewide elections in 2010. We find that those solutions that directly ad-
dress the underlying systemic problems of incentives and competition of
political actors, as described above, will be the most effective: the TDP
must engage South Texas communities, encourage political activity from
fresh sources, and increase its presence in the region.
A. Political Theory
Traditionally, political theory attempts to explain voter motivation that
centers on the voters themselves. 6 There are costs associated with vot-
ing, but income, education, and the like can overcome these costs and
make voting worthwhile. 7 Barriers to turnout are factors that make it
more difficult, more expensive, or less important to vote.' 8 Examples of
such barriers include socio-economic status, but also motivational expla-
nations, such as believing your vote will not make a difference. 9
Rosenstone and Hansen argue in their 1993 publication that these bar-
riers to voting tell only half of the story when it comes to voter turnout.
20
Their argument, backed by extensive statistical analysis, is that voter
turnout has declined since the 1960s in large part because political actors
do not ask citizens to vote. 2 1 Mobilization by a campaign or other politi-
cal actor, or the lack thereof, is a powerful indicator of whether or not a
person votes. 22 And, due to an increased use of technology and targeting,
6.77% in 2000: 19.74% versus 6.84% in 2004: and 32.97% versus 22.54% in 2008. Office of
the Secretary of State, http://elections.sos.state.tx.uslelchist.exe (select "County by County
Canvass Report" radio button; select desired Democratic Party Primary Election year
from the drop-down menu and click "Submit"; then select "President/Vice-President" from
the drop-down menu and click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
16. RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHo VOTES? 5-6 (1980).
17. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION,
ANi) DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 13-17 (1993).
18. Id. at 12.
19. Id. at 143 ("The public's waning sense of political efficacy ... has caused citizens
to disengage massively from politics and elections." (footnote omitted)).
20. Id. at 5 (arguing the "centrality of strategic mobilization" and explaining that their
research supplements political scientists' traditional concentration on individual theories of
participation). Rosenstone and Hansen state that their theory is necessary to "build upon,
depart from, and elaborate upon earlier theories of political participation and collective
action." Id.
21. Id. at 163-94, 213, 217.
22. STEVEN J. ROSENST[ONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTrICIPATION,
ANi) DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 209-10 (1993) ("Citizens who are contacted by political
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as opposed to the more traditional labor-intensive methods of canvassing,
mobilization has been slowly declining.23 Decreasing mobilization, the
authors find, explains fifty-four percent of the eleven percent decline in
voter turnout between the 1960s and the 1980s.2 4 Other indicators that
focus on the motivations of voters, such as reduced feelings of efficacy
(which explains nine percent of the decrease) and weakened attachment
to parties (which explains eleven percent of the decrease), turn out to be
significantly less important than declining activity of political leaders.25
This theory helps explain low voter turnout in South Texas, where in-
centives for political actors to mobilize voters differ greatly in general
elections, as compared to primary elections. In light of Rosenstone's and
Hansen's work, we will argue that critical barriers to voter turnout here
stem from political actors-not from voters. Electoral conditions clearly
affect South Texas voters; for example, a lack of competitive general elec-
tions makes citizens less enthusiastic about voting.26 However, we find
these noncompetitive races have an even more important impact on polit-
ical actors. Specifically, a lack of competitive races reduces the motiva-
tion for political actors to contact voters, which compounds the already
lackluster turnout in general elections. Of course, political actors do not
explain all the problems in voter turnout in this region; voters also play a
role.2 7 But because the TDP is in a position to impact the work of politi-
cal actors and because the work political actors do is so critical, we find
this theory particularly important to consider when working to increase
voter turnout in South Texas.
parties, exposed to intensely fought election campaigns, or inspired by the actions of social
movements are more likely to vote, to persuade, to campaign, and to give.").
23. Id. at 233-34: Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., Inequalities of Political Voice, in INE-
QUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO
LEARN 19, 68-69 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005). Well-educated White
people are more likely to use the Internet than those with lower socioeconomic status. Kay
Lehman Schlozman et al., Inequalities of Political Voice, in INEQUALrrY AND) AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AN1) WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 19, 68 (Lawrence R.
Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005). Thus, the use of Internet-based mobilization may
allow for new ideas and exchanges. but it does not involve new voters. Id. at 68-69. Al-
lowing those who are already mobilized to obtain greater access to political parties serves
only to exacerbate socioeconomic inequality. Id. at 69.
24. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOIBILIZATION, PARI-ICII'AIION,
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 215 tbl.7-1 (1993).
25. Id.
26. See Presidential Election Results. http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/
presidential.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (revealing that Texas general elections have
consistently favored Republican candidates for over thirty years, which is largely due to
Valley Democrats' reluctance to vote in general elections).
27. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION,
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 128 (1993).
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B. Methodology
Our research consisted of three primary methods: interviews, a litera-
ture review, and data analysis. Using a standardized interview protocol,
we interviewed South Texas political actors including local leaders,
elected officials, county chairs, party officials, volunteers, and nonprofit
leaders. The protocol asked for a narrative of what happened in the 2008
election, which voter turnout techniques were most effective in the eyes
of these political actors, and which barriers to turnout they found most
difficult to overcome. We also asked for input on potential solutions to
the problems that our interviewees mentioned. These interviews pro-
vided a deep understanding of the perceptions in the region, both of the
barriers to voter turnout and potential solutions. We also reviewed rele-
vant political science literature discussing barriers to voter turnout and
the effectiveness of techniques to increase political participation. Finally,
we utilized quantitative data from sources including the Texas Secretary
of State, local election clerks, tracking and exit polls, and the U.S. Census
Bureau to further examine the findings from our literature review and
our interviews.
In addition, we spoke with political actors who contributed to the 2008
Southern success stories of North Carolina2 8 and Virginia.29 In both
states, minority voter turnout was a key component to Democratic vic-
tory, and unprecedented resources were devoted to increasing minority
voter turnout. We also conducted an analysis of African-American voter
turnout for the Georgia Democratic Party. Unique elements of these
three states' experiences are included throughout as additional examples
and ideas.
Our analysis is based on the following twelve counties, which we have
designated as "South Texas": Brooks, Cameron, Dimmit, Duval, Hidalgo,
Jim Hogg, Maverick, Starr, Webb, Willacy, Zapata, and Zavala. Our data
analysis was limited to this specific region, but our interviews were not in
order to allow for a wider picture of voter turnout in the region. These
counties are heavily Hispanic, with an average Hispanic population of
approximately ninety percent.3 ° They are also geographically contiguous
28. In 2008, Lieutenant Governor Bev Perdue, a Democrat, narrowly edged out the
Republican mayor of Charlotte to become North Carolina's first female governor. North
Carolina: Tossup, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2008, at P14, available at 2008 WLNR 21173712.
29. In Virginia, Democrat Mark Warner trounced former Republican governor James
S. Gilmore III to claim one of Virginia's two Senate seats and help the Democratic Party
solidify its majority in the Senate. David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Widen Their Senate
Edge to a Solid Majority, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at P12, available at 2008 WLNR
21107302.
30. Brooks County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/48/48047.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (90.9% Hispanic); Cameron County
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and stretch from Brownsville, at the southern tip of Texas, along the bor-
der through Laredo and as far north as Eagle Pass. It is important to
note that while our region of interest is heavily Hispanic, many more His-
panics live in the urban centers of Houston and San Antonio, which we
do not analyze. It is unclear whether our findings would apply externally
to these areas.
QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48061.
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (86.3% Hispanic); Dimmit County QuickFacts from the
U.S. Census Bureau. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48127.html (last visited Apr.
9, 2010) (83.9% Hispanic); Duval County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48131.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (87.2% Hispanic);
Hidalgo County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/48/48215.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (89.6% Hispanic); Jim Hogg County
QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48247.
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (89.4% Hispanic); Maverick County QuickFacts from the
U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48323.html (last visited Apr.
9, 2010) (94.6% Hispanic); Starr County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48427.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (97.3% Hispanic);
Webb County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/48/48479.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (94.6% Hispanic); Willacy County
QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48489.
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (86.4% Hispanic); Zapata County QuickFacts from the U.S.
Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48505.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2010) (88.3% Hispanic); Zavala County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48507.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (89.9% Hispanic).
In 2008, only 36.5% of the population of Texas was Hispanic. Texas QuickFacts from the
U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2010). All data is current as of 2008.
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1. South Texas Demographics
SOUTH TEXAS DEMOGRAPHICS
3 1
I *I 'I ,i IIII . I
Brooks 91% $25,341 7,549
Cameron 86% $30,950 392,736
Dimmit 84% $27,895 9,758
Duval 87% $33,127 12,033
Hidalgo 90% $30,513 726,604
Jim Hogg 89% $33,104 5,016
Maverick 95% $29,787 52,279
Starr 97% $23,929 62,249
Webb 95% $36,537 236,941
Willacy 86% $29,079 20,600
Zapata 88% $32,249 13,847
Zavala 90% $23,083 11,678
Total: 1,551,290
Average 90% $29,632.83
Texas 36.5% $47,563 24,326,974
US 15.4% $50,740 304,059,724
2. South Texas Voter Turnout
Turnout in general elections in South Texas follows the trends of state-
wide turnout but remains consistently below the state average.32 In 2008,
the average statewide turnout was nearly sixty percent, but in these coun-
31. For sources of table data, see footnote 30; Texas QuickFacts from the U.S. Census
Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010); USA
QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
32. While the percentage of voter turnout has grown both statewide and in South
Texas, the South Texas counties average a voter turnout increasingly less than the Texas
statewide averages by over eleven percentage points in 1996 and 2000, over fourteen per-
centage points in 2004, and over sixteen percentage points in 2008. Office of the Secretary
of State, http://elections.sos.state.tx.uslelchist.exe (select "County by County Canvass Re-
port" radio button: then select desired General Election year from the drop-down menu
and click "Submit"; then select "President/Vice-President" from the drop-down menu and
click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
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ties, turnout was only forty-three percent.33 In 2008, general election
turnout in South Texas was the highest it had been in almost a decade.34
The Democratic vote was also higher in 2008 than it had been in the last
three presidential elections in these counties, at over sixty-nine percent.35
However, despite the fact that more registered voters in South Texas
voted in 2008, turnout in this region actually fell sixteen percentage
points behind the state average. 6 In the last decade, turnout here had
never lagged this much behind the rest of the state.3 7 In 2002, turnout
here was closest to the state average, falling only six percentage points
short, but the gap has since widened.38
Prior to the 2008 primary, concerted GOTV ("Get Out the Vote") ef-
forts from state and national campaigns were sporadic at best. The
Clintons made an effort to activate voters in the 1990s, 39 and gubernato-
rial candidate Tony Sanchez ran a campaign in South Texas in 2002,40 but
little else has happened since then. Dimmit County Chair Betty Sifuentes
recalled, "[T]he Presidential Election for the Clintons was probably the
last grassroots effort that sought to get the vote out."'" Even with the
competitive primary between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama in 2008,
turnout in the general election still fell far short of the state average.4 2
33. See Office of the Secretary of State, http:llelections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (se-
lect "County by County Canvass Report" radio button; then select "2008 General Elec-
tion" from the drop-down menu and click "Submit"; then select "President/Vice-
President" from the drop-down menu and click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
34. Ralph Blumenthal, Texas on Pace for Record Voter Turnout, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29,
2008, at A18, available at 2008 WLNR 4004772.
35. This percentage was found by dividing the total number of Democratic votes by
the total number of votes cast in each of the twelve counties in this study, then multiplying
by 100. in general elections for 2000, 2004, and 2008. Office of the Secretary of State, http:/
/elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select "County by County Canvass Report" radio but-
ton; then select desired General Election year from the drop-down menu and click "Sub-
mit"; then select "President/Vice-President" and click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Office of the Secretary of State, http:(/elections.sos.tx.us/elechist.exe (select
"County by County Canvass Report" radio button: then select "2002 General Election"
from the drop-down menu and click "Submit"; then select either "President/Vice-Presi-
dent" or "U.S. Senator" and click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
39. Peter Wallsten & Tom Hamburger, Campaign '08 Primary Strategies: Clinton-
Country Incursion, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18. 2008, at 1, available at 2008 WLNR 3140569.
40. Robert T. Garrett, Hispanics Embrace Conservative Label, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Feb. 24, 2010, at A03, available at 2010 WLNR 3903163.
41. Telephone Interview with Betty Sifuentes. Dimmit County Democratic Party
Chair (Dec. 23, 2008) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
42. Office of the Secretary of State, http:/Yelections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select
"County by County Canvass Report" radio button; then select "2008 General Election"
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The Voter Activation Network from the Democratic National Commit-
tee shows voter contact by the DNC and other organizations in 2008. 4"
This data is self-reported and includes contacts made via the mybarack-
obama.com interface, where activists could make phone calls from home.
In our region of analysis, a total of 205,999 contacts were made this year
during the general election. The DNC was responsible for only twenty-
two percent of the contacts, with local organizations making the vast ma-
jority of voter contact.
II. PROBLEMS PRESENTED: BARRIERS TO TURNOUT
A lack of competitive general election races and the presence of en-
trenched political factions within the Democratic Party result in conflict-
ing incentive structures that result in poor motivation for political actors
to contact voters. While other more traditionally cited barriers do come
into play in South Texas, we believe that these two features of South
Texas politics are primary contributors to poor turnout in general
elections.
A. Lack of Competitive Races: Primary Versus General
Noncompetitive races in the general election reduce motivations for
political actors to contact voters and reduce motivations for voters to go
to the polls, resulting in lower turnout." These counties are so heavily
Democratic that many of them do not have a Republican Party, nor do
they hold Republican primary elections.45 Local primary races between
Democrats are highly competitive, but because the winner of the Demo-
cratic primary automatically wins the general election, races for many of
the local offices important to South Texans are settled long before No-
vember. 6 We compare turnout in primary and general elections to mea-
sure the difference competitive races can make in South Texas.
from the drop-down menu and click "Submit": then select "PresidentNice-President" and
click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
43. Voter Activation Network data on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review
on Minority Issues.
44. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION,
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180 (1993) (explaining that the narrower the gap between
candidates, the more voter involvement in electoral politics).
45. See South Texas Can Be Turned Republican, http://texasgopvote.com/blog/south-
texas-can-be-turned-republican-01242 (Jan. 24, 2010, 5:52 CST) (expressing concern that
the Republican Party lacks a strong presence in South Texas). "Republican clubs and
county parties are nearly non-existent. The few leaders are volunteers who are handling
the job alone and with no guidance or support from the state party." Id.
46. Telephone Interview with Billy Leo, Mayor, La Joya, Tex. (Feb. 13, 2009) (on file
with The Scholar. St. Mary's Law Review on Minoritv Issues).
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Political actors tasked with getting voters to the polls (candidates, cam-
paigns, and paid field workers, or "politiqueros") have less incentive to
work during general elections. Candidates tend to limit their campaign
efforts to the weeks preceding the primary and are often largely absent
come November.4 7 La Joya Mayor Billy Leo explains, "In South Texas,
the great majority of candidates running in the primaries are Mexicano
Democrats. They run against each other with a passion you wouldn't be-
lieve."4 Mayor Leo further states, "[Candidates] bring people out to
vote from all over the damn place, working their butts off to get elected.
On Election Day during the general you don't see any of that."'4 9 The
political actors who are highly active during the primary have little moti-
vation to continue through the general election. As Mayor Leo states,
"[The politiqueros, they] carry out [the] vote, they pick up people physi-
cally [if] they're not voting. [But in the general,] no one will hire them
because there's no competition."'50
Local party organizations often rely on state and national campaigns
for outreach during the general election, but these campaigns usually do
not invest heavily in the region.: Says United States Congressman Solo-
mon Ortiz about his local party in Nueces County: "During this recent
cycle, our local party just took a back seat to all the Obama stuff going
on. They rode that wave instead of adding it on top of what they were
doing.""2 The result is that few actors reach out to voters during the gen-
eral election. Many voters wait for candidates to solicit their votes or
provide voting information, but it never happens.
In South Texas, the data agrees with the perceptions outlined above.
Primary election turnout here, as a percentage of registered voters, is sig-
nificantly higher than it is statewide." Though general election turnout
tends to exceed primary turnout in presidential election years, in 2008
when there was an unusually competitive presidential primary in addition
to competitive local primaries, primary and general election turnout were
both higher than in previous elections.5 4
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (explaining the role that politiqueros play in primary elections).
51. Telephone Interview with U.S. Rep. Solomon Ortiz (Feb. 13, 2008) (on file with
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
52. Id.
53. Office of the Secretary of State, http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select
"County by County Canvass Report" radio button; then select desired General Election
year from the drop-down menu and click "Submit"; then select "President/Vice-President"
or "U.S. Senator" and click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
54. Office of the Secretary of State. http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select
"County by County Canvass Report" radio button: then select the desired Democratic
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High turnout in the primaries but not in the general elections illustrates
our argument that deficits in turnout in South Texas are not limited to
factors that influence only voters. In fact, we find South Texas voters to
be surprisingly engaged in electoral politics-just not in the general elec-
tions, when political actors have less incentive to contact voters.
Party Primary year or General Election year from the drop-down menu and click "Sub-
mit": then select "President/Vice-President" or "U.S. Senator" and click "Submit") (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010).
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B. Factions and Politiqueros
Entrenched local political structures known as "factions" dominate
politics in South Texas to the disadvantage of the Democratic Party.
These factions stem from support of various local elected officials and
candidates and from their allegiance to the paid political operatives (poli-
tiqueros) who run their campaigns.55 Once again, the work of Rosen-
stone and Hansen is particularly applicable because this barrier concerns
political actors: these factions have incentive to prevent each other (as
well as other regional actors) from participating in voter outreach, which
negatively impacts campaign coordination, volunteerism, and, eventually,
voter turnout.
1. Competition Trumps Coordination
South Texas factions often harbor resentment and bad blood towards
one another, impeding Democratic Party efforts to coordinate on a re-
gional level. Victor Garza of the Hillary Clinton Campaign noted that
statewide and national candidates have difficulty navigating this region
for fear of stepping on toes.56 Jackie Solis-Chapa, also with the Clinton
Campaign, agrees: "[The factions] stem from local races, generations ago,
and people still harbor ill will."57 This was problematic even for daily
campaign operations. For example, despite the fact that everyone Chapa
worked with supported Tony Sanchez in the 2002 governor's race, Chapa
could not get the supporters to work together: "We couldn't even have
them in the office on the same day."' 58 Not only does this make volunteer
coordination difficult, but it gets in the way of information sharing. Local
political operatives often have monopolies on certain information and
voter files and keep these valuable resources out of the hands of others.
Significant inefficiency in campaigning results.
55. See Mike Mclntire & Michael Luo, Legal but Controversial, It Helped Get Out the
Vote, N.Y. TiMES, May 13, 2008, at A18, available at 2008 WLNR 8974961 (relating the
story of a politiquera who was "among at least 460 Texans, most of them rural Hispanics in
South Texas or African-Americans in Houston, who received payments from the Clinton
campaign for this kind of work").
56. Telephone Interview with Victor Garza, Tex. Deputy Dir., Clinton Campaign
(Dec. 29, 2008) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
57. Telephone Interview with Jackie Soliz-Chapa, S. Tex. for Clinton (Dec. 27, 2008)
(on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues). Soliz-Chapa empha-
sizes the importance of bringing in people from out of state because they do not have any
preconceived notions of how they want the region to operate. Id.
58. Id. The two groups had such intense animosity toward each other that organizers
had to ensure that each group worked on separate days and did not have to work together.
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2. Less Volunteerism
Because paid politiqueros dominate politics in South Texas, recruiting
volunteers can be difficult. Not only do potential volunteers feel like
their efforts won't make a difference, but many also expect monetary
compensation. 59 Nathan Seizer of Mi Familia Vota found the politiquero
system stifling in terms of recruiting volunteers in South Texas: "There is
no notion of real volunteerism for people here. They expect to be paid.
It's like ... 'I'm a volunteer ... wink, wink."' 6 ° Edward Adrian Sando-
val, former Student Government President at the University of Texas Pan
American, explained how factions turn off potential volunteers: "There's
a perception of corruption in the Valley. There are students and young
people in the Valley who would like to make a difference, but are turned
off by the cronyism and blatant corruption." 6 1
3. Less Voter Contact
Competition between politiqueros results in less voter contact in South
Texas. Even though the politiquero system is designed to win elections, it
actually gives operatives incentives to suppress turnout.6 Nathan Seizer
explains: "There are Valley folks that say, 'If you hire me on as a cam-
paign worker, I know I can churn out three hundred people to vote for
you.' They come up with a list of names, and the highest bidder gets
them."'6 3 Because these operatives want control over who votes, indepen-
dently mobilized voters with no allegiances are of no interest to them.6 4
Thus, the politiquero system does not undertake large-scale or regional
efforts to increase turnout.65 "And that's where it gets sticky," Seizer
explains. 66 "Within the Party all of these operatives are battling with
each other. It doesn't build the Party. It doesn't build participation."67
59. Mike Mclntire & Michael Luo, Legal but Controversial, It Helped Get Out the
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2008, at A18, available at 2008 WLNR 8974961 (referring to
politiqueros as "electoral soldiers of fortune").
60. Telephone Interview with Nathan Seizer, Project Coordinator, Mi Familia Vota
(Feb. 24, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues). "The
[s]tate should make a major investment in figuring out how to deal with the [Vialley." Id.
61. Telephone Interview with Edward Adrian Sandoval, Former President, Univ. of
Tex. Pan Am. Student Gov't Ass'n (Mar. 13, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's
Law Review on Minority Issues).
62. Telephone Interview with Nathan Seizer, Project Coordinator. Mi Familia Vota
(Feb. 24, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Telephone Interview with Nathan Seizer, Project Coordinator. Mi Familia Vota
(Feb. 24, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
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In some cases, factions may also cause campaigns and organizations to
avoid South Texas altogether .6 ' Latinos for Texas, for example, told us
that, in general, it avoids the Valley. 69 Though the organization would
like to go there, Political Director Crystal Viagran explained that it was
deterred by a perception that the Valley is "controlled by long-time polit-
icos" who "control most of the voting blocs" and "frown on outsiders." ''
But because they still successfully win primary elections, factions and
politiqueros do not seem likely to disappear from Valley politics on their
own.
4. Missed Opportunity: Ineffective Targeting
Because voters in South Texas span a wide geographic area, campaigns
target likely voters to conserve resources.7 1 While this strategy may help
ensure that likely voters turn out, it misses an opportunity to turn out
more potential Democratic voters. Where communities are politically
mixed, this type of targeting is a prudent way to avoid turning out Repub-
licans. 72 But in South Texas, where voters are so heavily Democratic, this
type of targeting leads to missed opportunities to turn out more Demo-
crats who are not currently participating.
Rosenstone and Hansen argue, furthermore, that political leaders tend
to target elites when they do voter outreach, especially in terms of solicit-
ing contributions or volunteers, which exacerbates existing inequalities in
political participation.73 This is especially true when competitive races
68. Telephone Interview with Crystal Viagrin, Political Dir., Latinos for Tex. (Jan. 6,
2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
69. Id. (explaining some of the reasons why her organization avoids operations in the
Valley). Viagrfin mentions the heavy involvement of the politiqueros in the Valley as one
reason why her organization finds it difficult to operate in the region. Id.
70. Id.
71. See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION. PARTICIPA-
TION, ANI) DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 163 (1993) ("Given their limited resources. ... par-
ties must decide on whom they will target their efforts. Resources they devote to people
who are unlikely to turn out or unlikely to support them are resources wasted.").
72. See Louis DESIPIO, COUNTING ON THE LATINO VOTE 30-31 (1996) (noting that
Hispanic voters overwhelmingly support Democratic tickets). According to DeSipio.
"[sjelecting high-concentration Latino sites weights the results in favor of the Democrats."
Id. at 30.
73. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION. PARTICIPATION,
ANI) DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 163-69 (1993). Because political parties want to win and
have limited resources with which to campaign, parties choose to target those who are
already most likely to vote. Id. at 163. As a result. "because so few people persuade,
volunteer, and contribute, party mobilization has its largest effect on the probability that
people who are otherwise most likely to participate in other electoral activities-[W]hites,
the wealthy. and the well[-]educated-actually will more extensively take part in elec-
tions." Id. at 173-74 (footnotes omitted): see also Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol,
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are at stake.74 South Texas is no exception: as Billy Leo explained, "You
need to focus on the others that won't vote already ... you need to target
the regular Joe, the masses, the uneducated voter, the people who don't
pay attention, the non-activists. The activists will always come out and
vote."'75 However, those who are most likely to turn out or to contribute
are the most likely to be contacted and for good reason.7 6 Representa-
tive Ortiz, like most elected officials, believes' that running a campaign
demands sophisticated targeting of likely voters:
My campaign does very targeted mail and phone calls, as well as
block walking. We targeted our precincts to where we knew we had
Democratic strongholds, to make sure they came out and voted. We
specifically targeted neighborhoods where we could generate sup-
port and votes, and in Republican neighborhoods we would target
even tighter.77
Targeting only urban areas in South Texas similarly misses an opportu-
nity to mobilize many potential Democratic voters. It might be cheaper
and easier to campaign in cities, but Congressman Ortiz and Victor Garza
both emphasized the importance of rural voters. According to Congress-
man Ortiz, "We really need to focus on those communities with weak
party systems, those smaller, rural counties. No one is engaging these
people on the local level."7 8 Garza pointed out that rural counties won
the primary in Texas for Hillary Clinton, despite the usual Democratic
strategy of targeting urban areas.7 9
Studying Inequality and American Democracy: Findings and Challenges, in INEQUALITY
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 214,216
(Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds.. 2005) (explaining that "when it comes to seek-
ing campaign contributors and volunteers[,] the Democratic Party converges on a... group
of affluent adherents" similar to those targeted by Republicans, effectively spending
money on those who may vote for the opposition party). Jacobs and Skocpol assert that
"[t]argeting the already active" often has the effect of "reinforce[ing] decrements and ine-
qualities in voter turnout." Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Studying Inequality and
American Democracy: Findings and Challenges, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY: WHAT WE KNOW AN1) WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 214, 216 (Lawrence R. Jacobs &
Theda Skocpol eds., 2005).
74. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION,
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 183 (1993).
75. Telephone Interview with Billy Leo, Mayor, La Joya, Tex. (Feb. 13, 2009) (on file
with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
76. David Callahan, Ballot Blocks: What Gets the Poor to the Polls?, THE AM. PROS-
PEC-r, July 1, 1998, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=ballot-blocks.
77. Telephone Interview with U.S. Rep. Solomon Ortiz (Feb. 13, 2008) (on file with
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
78. Id.
79. Telephone Interview with Victor Garza, Tex. Deputy Dir.. Clinton Campaign
(Dec. 29, 2008) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
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Though data from many South Texas counties remains to be seen, re-
sults from Cameron and Hidalgo County indicate that while such discrim-
inatory targeting is not ubiquitous, it certainly exists.8" In Cameron
County, high-performing Democrats were contacted at much higher rates
than low-performing Democrats within the Hispanic voting population.
In Hidalgo County, though, where there was the most voter contact and
where there are fewer Republicans, low-performing Democrats were con-
tacted at about the same rate as high-performing Democrats within the
Hispanic voting population.
2008 VOTER CONTACT IN CAMERON COUNTY
BY DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE
10,000
8,000
6,000-
4,000
2,000
75%+ 65-74% 55-64% 45-54% 30-44%
Democratic Performance
2008 VOTER CONTACT IN HIDALGO COUNTY
BY DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE
14,000
12,000
10,000--
8,000--
6,000--
4,000--
2,000--
75%+ 65-74% 55-64% 45-54% 30-44%
Democratic Performance
80. Data obtained from the Voter Activation Network on file with The Scholar: St.
Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues.
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In South Texas, ineffective targeting does a disservice to the Demo-
cratic Party, which is not only predicated on ideals of inclusion, but also
depends on low-income, minority voters (who are low-propensity voters)
for support.81
In fact, such targeting may explain, in part, why state and national cam-
paigns have long neglected South Texas. Literature from Louis
DeSipio,8 2 as well as interviews with campaign operatives, suggest that
some campaigns avoid entire Hispanic communities based on perceptions
that they are disproportionately ineligible to vote. Daniel Crawford, an
Obama organizer in Georgia, explained that though he wanted to make
inroads with the Hispanic community, "flor every one Latino you had
who was a U.S. citizen, you had nine who weren't, which made voter
mobilization and tactics really difficult. You could talk to five hundred
people at a grocery store and end up registering ten."83 The literature
supports the hypothesis that this may impact how many low-income or
minority voters are contacted by political actors: Jacobs and Skocpol ar-
gue that typical campaign targeting exacerbates inequalities by locating
voters who already lean the "right" way and are likely to vote-voters
who are disproportionately high-income and White.84 A 1995 study
found that, while 40.1% of White voters nationwide report having been
asked to contact a government official, only 9.3% of Latinos were
asked. 5
Whether it is true that organizers avoid contacting Hispanic voters in
South Texas for these reasons, this perception makes it less likely that the
many eligible voters in these communities will be contacted. By similarly
writing off rural areas or other voting blocs deemed low-propensity, the
Party misses potential to mobilize a swath of likely Democratic voters.
81. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Studying Inequality and American De-
mocracy: Findings and Challenges, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT
WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED ro LEARN 214, 216 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda
Skocpol eds.. 2005) (criticizing targeting efforts that focus on the affluent and the well-
educated-those already most likely to vote-because these efforts neglect the groups
most likely to vote Democratic).
82. Louis DESIPIO, COUNTING ON THE LATINO VOTE: LATINOS AS A NEW ELECTO-
RATE (1996).
83. Telephone Interview with Daniel Crawford, Reg'l Field Dir., Obama for America
(2008) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
84. Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Studying Inequality and American Democ-
racy: Findings and Challenges, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE
KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN 214, 216-17 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Theda
Skocpol eds., 2005).
85. JAN E. LEIGHLEY, STRENGTH IN NUMI3ERS? THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF
RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 102 (2001).
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5. Disclaimer: Lack of Resources
A lack of resources in the Democratic Party in Texas is clearly a stum-
bling block to increasing turnout and winning elections; it directly influ-
ences what political actors are able to do in terms of voter contact.
86
However, the lack of resources problem is recursive. While the impor-
tance of money is quite real, complaints about a lack of resources
threaten the Party's reputation and make donors less willing to contrib-
ute, which, in turn, makes gathering resources a challenge.87 For this rea-
son, we will simply note that this is a legitimate problem here, but we will
not focus our analysis or our potential solutions on the need to simply
spend more money in the region.
The aforementioned barriers that influence political actors and their
motivation and ability to contact voters explain, in large part, the low
turnout we observe in general elections in South Texas. Like Rosenstone
and Hansen, we emphasize that mobilization by political actors, or the
lack thereof, has a critical and undernoted impact on whether or not
these Democrats will vote.
C. Traditional Barriers
The barriers to turnout outlined in traditional political science litera-
ture on voting also come into play in South Texas. Here, we briefly ex-
plore the barriers that impact the costs associated with voting. Our
analysis, however, focuses primarily on political actors.
1. Registration
Registration restrictions are often cited as a significant barrier to voter
turnout, but in South Texas, registration does not actually seem to be a
serious impediment. In fact, based on figures from the Texas Secretary of
State88 and the Census,8 9 the number of registered voters in each county
is quite high.
86. See David Callahan, Ballot Blocks: What Gets the Poor to the Polls?, THE AM.
PROSI'EC7, July I, 1998, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=ballot-
blocks ("The basic approach of community organizing groups is to empower poor people
by helping them to achieve victories that directly affect their neighborhoods and thus to
see that political involvement is not pointless. Getting the poor into the habit of voting is
one long-term aim of this strategy.").
87. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICII'ATION.
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 133-34 (1993).
88. Office of the Secretary of State, http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe (select
"County by County Canvass Report" radio button; then select "2008 General Election"
from the drop-down menu and click "Submit"; then select "President/Vice President" and
click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
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2. Early Voting
The percentage of registered voters voting early in South Texas is cur-
rently at only 24.95% 9°-more than fourteen percentage points less than
the state average.9' This indicates potential problems in the laws and reg-
ulations that govern how early voting is conducted.
The most populous South Texas counties in 2008 also show a tendency
for the Hispanic population to have considerably lower early voter turn-
OUt. 9 2 Low early voter turnout could be a problem in this region and,
89. Texas QuickLinks from the US Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/480001k.html (click on "Estimates for Texas counties" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 9,
2010).
90. Brooks County Voter Registration Figures, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/
historical/brooks.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (992 early voters out of 6456 registered
voters, or 15.37%): Cameron County Voter Registration Figures. http://www.sos.state.tx.us/
elections/historical/cameron.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (38,763 early voters out of
174,428 registered voters, or 22.22%); Dimmit County Voter Registration Figures, http://
www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/dimmit.shtml (last visited Apr. 9. 2010) (1822 early
voters out of 7487 registered voters, or 24.34%); Duval County Voter Registration Figures,
http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/duval.shtmi (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (2283
early voters out of 9345 registered voters, or 24.43%): Hidalgo County Voter Registration
Figures. http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/hidalgo.shtml (last visited Apr. 9,
2010) (86,692 early voters out of 305,316 registered voters, or 28.39%): Jim Hogg County
Voter Registration Figures, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/imhogg.shtml
(last visited Apr. 9. 2010) (622 early voters out of 3897 registered voters, or 15.96%): Mav-
erick County Voter Registration Figures, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/
maverick.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (5497 early voters out of 27,050 registered voters,
or 20.32%); Starr County Voter Registration Figures, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/
historical/starr.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (3925 early voters out of 27,474 registered
voters, or 14.29%): Webb County Voter Registration Figures. http://www.sos.state.tx.us/
elections/historical/webb.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (27,553 early voters out of
105,448 registered voters, or 26.13%); Willacy County Voter Registration Figures, http://
www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/willacy.shtml (last visited Apr. 9. 2010) (1506 early
voters out of 11,278 registered voters, or 13.35%); Zapata County Voter Registration
Figures. http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/zapata.shtml (last visited Apr. 9,
2010) (1041 early voters out of 7224 registered voters, or 14.41%); Zavala County Voter
Registration Figures, http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/historical/zavala.shtml (last visited
Apr. 9, 2010) (2306 early voters out of 8124 registered voters, or 28.39%). All data is from
2008.
91. HOPE ANDRADE, TEX. SEC'Y OF STATE, RACE SUMMARY REPORT: UNOFFICIAL
ELEC-ION TAItJLATJON, 2008 GENERAL ELECrnON 1 (2008), available at http://www.sos.
state.tx.us/elections/forms/enrrpts/2008gen.pdf (5,351,660 voted early in the 2008 General
Election out of 13,575,062 registered voters statewide, or 39.42%). In Texas, early voting
begins seventeen days before Election Day and ends four days before Election Day. TEX.
ELEC. CODE. ANN. § 85.001(a) (Vernon 2010).
92. The South Texas counties with the highest populations overall are Hidalgo, Cam-
eron, Webb, Starr, and Maverick; among these, the county with the highest Hispanic popu-
lation is Starr (97% Hispanic), which had the lowest early voting turnout in 2008 (14.29%):
the county with the lowest Hispanic population is Cameron (86% Hispanic), which had the
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while not the emphasis of our analysis, it is worth considering when de-
signing voter turnout strategies in South Texas.93
3. Socioeconomic Status
Traditionally, political science on voting finds socioeconomic status to
be an important barrier.94 Rosenstone and Hansen find that the wealthi-
est Americans are 1.5.8% more likely to vote in presidential elections and
that college-educated Americans are 16.6% more likely to vote in presi-
dential elections than the average voter.95 The effect of race and culture
on electoral participation is less clear. Some studies indicate that race is a
factor only because it is so closely tied to socioeconomic status. 9 6 For
instance, some political scientists argue that "once group disparities in
participatory resources-in particular education, income, and job-related
civic skills-are taken into account, the disparities in participation among
non-Hispanic [W]hites, African[-]Americans, and Hispanics disappear." '97
Race and other socioeconomic factors are issues whose resolution is
clearly beyond the scope of any campaign organization, but they should
be kept in mind when formulating strategies to turn out minority voters.
III. LEGAL BARRIERS
A. History of Election Law and Preclearance
The history of election law with regard to preclearance provides impor-
tant background for the equal voting rights of all citizens, minority or
otherwise. The Fifteenth Amendment states, "[T]he right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 98 The amendment also
mandates that Congress has "the power to enforce this article by appro-
highest early turnout rate in 2008 (51.24%). See footnote 90 for South Texas early voter
turnout figures.
93. Cf Sean Flynn, Comment, One Person, One Vote, One Application: District Court
Decision in Ray v. Texas Upholds Texas Absentee Voting Law that Disenfranchises Elderly
and Disabled Voters, 11 SCHOLAR 469, 509 (2009) (describing the unintended impact of
Texas Election Code § 84.004, which criminalizes signing as a witness multiple absentee
ballot applications on behalf of early voters who, by reason of illiteracy or disability, can-
not physically sign their own ballots). Thus, early voting restrictions may have an excep-
tionally adverse impact on elderly Hispanic voters in South Texas. See id.
94. RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE. WHO VOTES? 13 (1980).
95. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION. PARTICIPATION,
AN!) DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 134-35 (1993).
96. Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., Inequalities of Political Voice, in INEQUALIIY ANL)
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED 1O LEARN 19,40 (Law-
rence R. Jacobs & Theda Skocpol eds., 2005).
97. Id.
98. U.S. CONsTr. amend. XV, § 1.
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priate legislation."9 9 Unfortunately, Congress's early attempts to provide
equal voting rights "were inconsistently applied and repealed with the
rise of Jim Crow,""' effectively denying racial minorities the right to
vote.
Congress responded with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).HnH
The VRA prohibits any "standard, practice, or procedure" that "results
in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color."' 102 The VRA abolished all literacy
tests and other kinds of testing used for voter disqualification." 3 The
Supreme Court relied on the VRA to end the practice of racial
disenfranchisement. 104
One particularly important part of the VRA is Section 5, which disal-
lows any changes to state election procedure without preclearance by a
panel of three federal district court judges in Washington, D.C. or by the
United States Attorney General. 105 Preclearance will only be granted if
the proposed change "neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."'
10 6
Congress reauthorized the VRA in 1970, 1975, and 1982, and most re-
cently in 2006.117 The Supreme Court has "upheld each of these
reauthorizations against constitutional challenges, finding that circum-
stances continued to justify the provisions. '"108 Additionally, rather than
diminish the prerequisite clearance standards, "Congress [has] amassed a
sizable record in support of its decision to extend the preclearance re-
quirements," and as recently as June 2009, the Supreme Court declined to
rule that preclearance is unconstitutional.' 0 9
99. Id. § 2.
100. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S.Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009) (cit-
ing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966)).
10l. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (2006).
102. Id. § 2(a).
103. Id.
104. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S.Ct. at 2509.
105. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5(a).
106. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S.Ct. at 2509.
107. Jeffrey Toobin, Voter, Beware, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 2. 2009, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/03/02/090302tacotalk_toobin.
108. Nw. Austin Mon. Util. Dist. No. One, 129 S.Ct. at 2510 (citing Georgia v. United
States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973)).
109. Id. at 2513 (refusing to consider the constitutionality of Section 5 in favor of
resolving the case on other grounds). In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the major-
ity opinion's "constitutional avoidance" of Section 5 suggests that the Court does not be-
lieve that the provision is constitutional. Id. at 2518 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Asserting
that "it is necessary to definitively resolve" whether Section 5 is unconstitutional. Justice
Thomas, for his part, answered in the affirmative. Id. at 2515.
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B. Texas's Proposed Voter Identification Law and the Problem of
Preclearance
The Texas legislature is currently considering a stringent voter identifi-
cation law.''" This law would require that all registered voters in Texas,
when arriving at their polling places, must present a voter registration
card and a form of photo identification.' 11 This law will likely adversely
affect minority populations in South Texas because any extra procedural
costs required for voting most directly impact those with the least amount
of political resources, namely, racial and ethnic minorities.' 12
1. Texas Senate Bill 362
On March 18, 2009, the Texas Senate passed Senate Bill 362, which if
passed in the Texas House of Representatives would require all voters to
present photographic identification at the polling place.'"' If the bill is
passed in a future session, Texas will join seven other states in mandating
additional identification in order to vote.'' 4 This is problematic because
those voters without identification-often elderly, poor, and minority
voters-will be barred from exercising their Fifteenth Amendment
right.' 15
110. R.G. Ratcliffe & Janet Elliott, Voter ID Battle Heads to Senate, Hous. CHRON.,
Mar. 10. 2010. available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6302093.
html.
111. Tex. S.B. 362, 81st Leg., R.S. §§ 6, 10 (2009).
112. See Matt A. Barreto et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Indiana Voter ID
Requirements on the Electorate 4 (Wash. Inst. for the Study of Ethnicity & Race, Working
Paper), available at http:/depts.washington.eduluwiserldocumentsllndiana-voter.pdf.
113. Texas Legislature Online-81(R) History for SB 362, http://www.capitol.state.tx.
us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=81 R&Bill=SB362 (last visited Apr.9, 2010).
114. State Requirements for Voter ID, http://www.ncsl.orgILegistaturesElectionsl
ElectionsCampaigns/StateRequirementsforVoterIDltabid/16602Default.aspx#tx (last vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2010).
115. Matt A. Barreto et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Indiana Voter ID Require-
ments on the Electorate 13-15 (Wash. Inst. for the Study of Ethnicity & Race, Working
Paper), available at http://depts.washington.edu/uwiserldocuments/Indiana voter.pdf. Ac-
cording to this study, Whites are significantly better able to access photo identification than
non-Whites. Id. at 13. Similarly, access to identification decreases as age over fifty in-
creases, from 86.2% access at age fifty, to 85.1% at age sixty, to 81.4% at age seventy-five,
and to 74.3% at age eighty-five. Id. at 14. Moreover, voter identification laws have a
partisan impact: statistically. Republicans have greater access to identification than Demo-
crats, putting an extra burden on those who typically vote Democratic. Id. at 16. As a
result of Indiana's photo identification laws, "minority, low-income, and less educated In-
diana residents are less likely to have access to valid photo identification. This strongly
implies that Indiana voting laws significantly reduce the opportunity to vote for these seg-
ments of the state electorate." Id. Notably, however, Texas's proposed requirement is less
stringent than Indiana's. Compare Tex. S.B. 362. 81st Leg., R.S. §§ 6. 10 (2009) (requiring
that a voter present either photo identification or multiple non-photographic identifica-
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Texas Senator Leticia Van de Putte questioned the ability of the Texas
legislature to defend this bill on preclearance.' 16 Senator Van De Putte
asked the Deputy Secretary of State, "Does the Secretary of State track
the racial status of registered voters? If not, how will the state prove that
Senate Bill 362 does not have an adverse impact on minority voters when
the state submits the bill for preclearance?"'"' 7 The Deputy Secretary of
State responded:
Because racial status is not considered in a person's eligibility to reg-
ister to vote[ 1, the state[-]prescribed voter registration application
does not request this information from voters. As a result, the state
does not have statistics regarding the race or ethnicity of registered
voters in Texas. We do have data on the number of registered voters
with Hispanic surnames, but this data is inconclusive as it simply
matches the surname of registered voters against a list of identified
Hispanic surnames provided by the U.S. Census Bureau." 8
The Deputy Secretary of State surmised that "[a] similar effort to obtain
[data on race and ethnicity] may be required for a voter identification
bill," but proposed no plans to compile this data." 9
Without a clear understanding of how this voter identification bill will
affect minorities, Texas risks deterring Hispanic voters in South Texas,
many of whom do not have the resources to provide election agents with
additional identification.12 If the Texas legislature is unable to defend
the bill with the data requested by Senator Van de Putte, it is unlikely
that it will pass the necessary preclearance. Thus, the Texas legislature's
tions), with IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1 (West 2009) (requiring that an election official
challenge any voter who does not present proof of identification) and IND. COE ANN. § 3-
5-2-40.5 (West 2009) (defining "proof of identification" as a document that "shows a pho-
tograph of the individual to whom the document was issued").
116. S.J. of Tex., 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. 590-91 (2009), available at http://www.journals.
senate.state.tx.us/sjrn l/81r/pdf/81 RSJO3-18-F.PDF#pages=7.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Joel A. Heller, Note, Fearing Fear Itself: Photo Identification Laws, Fear of
Fraud, and the Fundamental Right to Vote, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1878 (2009) ("[V]oters
who lacked a photo ID tended also to lack the means to obtain one."); Matt A. Barreto et
al., The Disproportionate Impact of Indiana Voter ID Requirements on the Electorate 4
(Wash. Inst. for the Study of Ethnicity & Race, Working Paper), available at http://
depts.washington.edu/uwiser/documents/Indiana-voter.pdf (explaining the burden of these
identification laws upon minority voters).
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efforts to pass the bill would merely waste state resources and endorse
discrimination. 12 1
2. Bilingual Ballots
Another bill that stalled in the Texas legislature in 2009 would have
prohibited the use of taxpayer dollars to produce Spanish-language voter
forms and instructions. 122 Though the bill stalled after only one read-
ing, 123 its introduction is a reminder of the ongoing threat to Hispanic
voters in South Texas.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits the administration of English-
only elections, requiring that counties with significant linguistic minorities
provide election documents in both English and the predominant second
language.1 24 In Texas, any county in which five percent or more of the
citizens are of Hispanic origin or descent must provide election materials
in both English and Spanish.' 25 These materials include early voting ap-
plications and materials; Election Day instruction posters, ballots, and af-
fidavits; and other forms that voters are required to sign.
126
Opponents of bilingual ballots argue that providing materials in several
languages is expensive and ineffective and that Congress does not have
the power to regulate state electoral procedure. 27  But the Supreme
Court stated in Ex Parte Virginia that it is within the purview of Congress
to pass legislation in order to enforce the Civil War Amendments.' 28 This
ruling was reaffirmed in 1966, when the Court declared in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach that Congress has broad power to regulate states' voting
121. If Texas goes forward with this voter identification law, not only will the legisla-
ture have to obtain demographics on race and ethnicity in order to make a case for
preclearance, but it will likely have to endure costly litigation expenses in federal courts.
122. Tex. H.B. 81, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009) (forbidding state agencies in Texas from using
public money to print any document in a language other than English).
123. Texas Legislature Online-81(R) History for H.B. 81, http://www.capitol.state.tx.
us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=81R&Bill=HB81 (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
124. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(f), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f) (2006).
125. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 272.002 (Vernon 2003). The law has given a voice to
the language minority in Texas. Brian J. Sutherland, The Patchwork of State and Federal
Language Assistance for Minority Voters and a Proposal for Model State Legislation, 65
N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 323, 360 (2009).
126. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 272.004-272.005 (Vernon 2003).
127. James Thomas Tucker, The Battle over "Bilingual Ballots" Shifts to Courts: A
Post-Boerne Assessment of Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 45 HARV. J. ON LEcIS. 507,
510-11 (2008).
128. 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
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practices. 2 Thus, Congress has expansive power to limit racial discrimi-
nation at the polls.13
Both the federal Voting Rights Act and the Texas Election Code re-
quire that Spanish language election materials are provided in heavily
Spanish-speaking counties, such as those in South Texas. But both of
these proposed Texas bills would present significant barriers to turnout in
South Texas. Not only would voters who are unable to present photo
identification at the polls-despite being legally registered-be denied
the right to vote, but those who do not speak or read English would also
be prevented from exercising their Fifteenth Amendment right. The
problem of voter turnout is both societal and cultural, but legal barriers
also block minority access to the polls on the most fundamental level.
Despite these barriers, when explaining low voter turnout in South
Texas, it is critical to understand the influence of political actors and the
incentive structures they face to mobilize voters. As such, the primary
barriers to turnout in the region are a lack of competitive races and politi-
cal factions. Turnout differences between primary and general elections
illustrate, to some degree, the impact that political actors can have on
potential voters. Other barriers involving the voters themselves and their
willingness and ability to go to the polls are important as well, but they
are not the emphasis of our analysis.
IV. SOLUTIONS
The proposed solutions to the problems laid out in the first three parts
of this Article fall into three categories: engaging South Texas communi-
ties, encouraging new political activity, and opposing discriminatory legis-
lative action. The first-engaging South Texas communities-speaks to
the problem of election activity disappearing after the primaries. The
second-encouraging new political activity-seeks to dilute the influence
of factions in the region. Because both of these problems deal with the
work of political actors, our solutions propose ways that the TDP can
alter the poor incentive structures in the region.
129. 383 U.S. 301, 327-28 (1966).
130. JOHN MA13RY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIF-
TEEN-rH AMENDMENT 105 (1909).
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Incentive Structures for Political Actors
Problem Solution Specific Recommendations
Lack of Engage - TDP Presence in South Texas
Competitive South Texas - Involve South Texas in State Party
Races Communities Structure
- Train Local Parties
- Sustain Community Organizing
- Legislative Action: Municipal
Election Changes
Factions Encourage New - Encourage State and National
Political Activity Campaign Presence
- Get Young People Involved
Finally, the TDP must actively oppose discriminatory legislation that
threatens Hispanic voters' ability to participate at the polls.
A. Engage South Texas Communities
Because little political activity takes place in South Texas between pri-
mary elections, this section focuses on ways to generate and maintain
community involvement in local affairs that will outlast the primaries.
We will look at five ways in which the TDP can help correct the incentive
problems present during general elections: by increasing TDP presence in
South Texas, by involving South Texas in the TDP structure, by training
local parties, by providing sustained community organizing, and through
legislative action.
1. TDP Presence in South Texas
Opening a TDP office in South Texas would give the TDP an unprece-
dented presence in the region, as well as a convenient hub from which to
centralize campaign activity in the Valley. Opening an office is obviously
a considerable expense, but the returns would be substantial. While
county party organizations serve as representatives of the TDP in the re-
gion, their efforts would be more effective with the backing of a regional
office. Such an office is valuable not only for the purposes of building
capacity and providing adequate training, but also because it would allow
the TDP to provide an alternative to local factions.
To save resources and political capital, the office should open only after
the primary election is over; the TDP should step in when local actors no
longer have incentives to participate but when the TDP needs these vot-
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ers the most. Having the campaign office open during the primaries
would not be as wise of an investment, since it is unlikely that rival fac-
tions would bond over the shared office space. 13 ' After the primaries, the
TDP staffer-already responsible for overseeing South Texas activity,
building rapport with South Texas leaders, and developing a network of
volunteers and activists-can oversee the office as a full-time South Texas
director.
The office would help with coordination between campaigns, increase
the TDP's ability to contact voters, and help align local interests with the
interests of the TDP. This solution touches on the major problems that
arise from factions and from a lack of resources. The office would serve
as a central location for volunteers, helping to launch a permanent volun-
teer base aligned with the Democratic Party instead of with politiqueros.
An increased TDP presence in the region would also make nonprofits
that are concerned with factions feel less threatened. In turn, an in-
creased presence of respected nonprofits in the region would help dilute
the influence of the politiquero network. While the TDP cannot directly
coordinate with nonprofits for legal reasons, the mere presence of the
TDP will create an environment more conducive to nonprofit activity
that would supplement the activities of the TDP.
The TDP should open a regional office in South Texas, resources per-
mitting. This investment would have a very high return, perhaps the high-
est of any of our recommendations, despite its high costs.
2. Involve South Texas in State Party Structure
The TDP should work to involve South Texas leaders and local parties
more in its convention process. Victor Garza explained: "Until the South
Texas community participates in the convention process and makes an
argument to change how these decisions [about resource allocation] are
made, it's difficult for us to complain."' 32 Currently, delegate representa-
tion is determined by general election turnout, per state election law and
TDP rules.13 3 This rule, intended to encourage greater general election
turnout, actually achieves the opposite result because it decreases the
commitment of those who are underrepresented in the process to TDP
goals. Some have suggested that primary election turnout be used, in
131. Telephone Interview with Jackie Soliz-Chapa, S. Tex. for Clinton (Dec. 27, 2008)
(on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
132. Telephone Interview with Victor Garza, Tex. Deputy Dir.. Clinton Campaign
(Dec. 29. 2008) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
133. Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back, TEx. OBSERVER, Mar. 21, 2008, at 20. avail-
able at 2008 WLNR 7075417.
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part, to determine delegate selection. Others respond that this would
negatively impact general election turnout by decreasing incentives for
voters to turn out (though we disagree, as none of the major sources of
low turnout in the general election stem from representation in the con-
vention process).
Giving South Texans more of a say in TDP operations would actually
give party operatives greater incentives to reach out to the region. Cur-
rently, local campaigns and parties feel like they are "on their own" and
are less invested in the regional or statewide mission of the party. Partici-
pation in the activities of the TDP would give South Texans reason to stay
involved beyond the primaries, and state leaders reason to keep South
Texans engaged. Involving local political actors in decisions at the TDP
level would also help to align their incentives with the goals of the Party
as a whole.
While changing the rules by which delegates are appropriated to vari-
ous regions would be difficult, we argue that it would be worthwhile,
given the potential value to the TDP of correcting the isolation of South
Texas politics. However, even without changing these rules, South Texas
can still be more involved in TDP decision-making. For example, the
TDP could hold more workshops in the region to solicit input on the
platform or on other important Party decisions. The costs of implement-
ing this solution are mostly political. Other regional interests within the
Party may feel threatened by increased input from South Texas leaders.
However, given the critical importance of this region in any statewide
strategy, proportional representation within the Party is probably long
overdue. Other costs might include the administrative costs of holding
workshops or creating surveys. Local buy-in of this reform would likely
be quite high-everyone wants to be heard and to be solicited for input.
We recommend that the Party involve South Texas representatives more
in the convention and platform development processes.
3. Train Local Parties
The TDP could invest more in the professional development of its
County Chairs in South Texas to help them develop ways to build and
sustain Democratic Party involvement. Currently, the Texas Democratic
County Chairs Association (TDCCA)' 34 holds frequent trainings for
134. Texas Democratic County Chairs Association, http://www.tdcca.org (last visited
Apr. 9, 2010).
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County Chairs, but does not regularly hold trainings in South Texas.135
Though the TDCCA holds trainings in San Antonio in hopes of attracting
more Chairs from South Texas, TDCCA President Bill Holcomb explains
that many South Texas County Chairs do not have the resources to take
the time and money to travel to San Antonio.'36 The TDP also trains
County Chairs and provides information about best practices from its
Austin office, but once again, a stronger presence in the region would
increase the impact of these efforts, making local party organizations no-
tice and appreciate resources more.
While County Chairs are a vital resource, some still remain uninvolved.
Holcomb explains, "Most of them are new chairs and they're so busy get-
ting their feet on the ground because they're just trying to learn the basics
and don't realize I can help them."' 37 Making the trainings more availa-
ble in their region would lower the costs of County Chairs' involvement.
Currently, the TDP and the TDCCA coordinate to some extent, but the
partnership between the two organizations should be further developed.
For instance, the TDP could host more events for which the TDCCA
could provide the speakers and training.
The TDP could also, from a regional office, better solicit and circulate
information on best practices for these local leaders. While there is no
doubt that these leaders are highly invested in their communities, as our
interviews have shown, their methods vary by county and are often infor-
mal. As we discussed, some counties have very active local parties, and
others do not. The resources available to these leaders to improve their
performance and facilitate coordination and information-sharing are too
limited. Currently, the gaps are often filled by politiqueros alone.
This solution addresses several of the problems we have discussed. As
these leaders are highly invested in their communities and often re-
present different factions or regional interests, increasing their contact
with the TDP, especially through a regional office, would go a long way
towards aligning local interests with state interests. This solution also ad-
dresses coordination problems that result from factions monopolizing
useful information. More effective coordination would also presumably
increase the ability of local parties to turn out voters. Finally, such train-
ing develops community leaders who are invested in the TDP, instead of
just in local races, which development would build a volunteer base that
135. Telephone Interview with Bill Holcomb, President, Tex. Democratic County
Chairs Ass'n (Mar. 16, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority
Issues).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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lasts beyond any particular election. The problems, again, are the most
critical in South Texas, so this reform would greatly help.
Training County Chairs and sharing best practices is a high-impact re-
form; we suggest it be implemented if resources are available, regardless of
the presence of a statewide or national campaign in the region.
4. Sustained Community Organizing Presence
As part of the TDP's efforts to increase its presence in South Texas, a
regional office could actively engage the community during elections and
throughout the year. Holding local events, designating block captains,
and other strategies are already working well in South Texas, and the
TDP could go beyond traditional GOTV efforts to fund and organize
such activities. Currently, these events and voter efforts are limited to
local campaigns and candidates, instead of the Democratic Party more
generally.
The resources to hold events and the labor costs of tapping community
leadership and implementing and supervising neighborhood responsibil-
ity programs could be substantial. They would likely be much smaller,
however, than the costs of conducting extensive messaging research, de-
veloping more complete voter lists, and doing any number of traditional
voter outreach strategies, such as by mail, phone, or block walking. For
these reasons, we classify these costs as moderate. Local buy-in would
likely be very high, as these events present opportunities for local leaders
to gain exposure and for local neighborhoods and parties to hold more
events and work with the TDP to develop more formal neighborhood
organization plans. If this strategy is implemented in tandem with the
regional TDP office, as described above, the costs of adding community
organizing policies would likely be even lower, and the benefits would be
higher (because these policies would nicely reinforce the increased pres-
ence of the TDP in South Texas).
There are two types of community organizing-local events and block
captain structures-that our interviewees found particularly effective and
that we recommend the TDP undertake. The first type is local events.
Despite limited involvement from campaigns, local party organizations
found success hosting local events. County Chair Michael Guerra, for
instance, explains, "We put on events like picnics and dances to remind
people to get out and vote because none of the local races do anything in
November."' 3 8
138. Telephone Interview with Michael Guerra, Brooks County Democratic Party
Chair. Brooks County, Tex. (Dec. 13, 2008) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Re-
view on Minority Issues).
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Literature supports the idea that local events can make a difference in
voter turnout. Addonizio, Green, and Glaser measured the impact of an
Election Day festival in New Hampshire to determine whether "putting
the party back into politics" increases voter turnout. 139 They found that
the festival increased voter turnout in this locality by 10.4 percentage
points.4 41 Rosenstone and Hansen clearly agree that political actors and
the outreach they organize are critical factors in determining turnout.' 4 '
In fact, almost all of our interviewees emphasized the importance of
"pachangas," or political barbeques. According to Representative Ortiz,
"You can flood TV and radio with commercials," but "if you don't have
someone on the ground locally doing more than your traditional media,
having little pachangas, distributing flyers with local taste, a local touch,
you lose a lot of people. It happens in a lot of South Texas counties. The
local, personal touch matters to people when they vote." 142 Hosting
these types of events can help sustain activity between primary elections,
when such events are currently scarce.
The second type of community organizing is the use of block captains.
County Chair Gilberto Hinojosa explained the "block captain" program,
which was hugely successful in Cameron County. 4 3 First, the TDP
targeted the twenty-five to thirty largest precincts in the county. 14 4 The
TDP conducted a phone bank, during which volunteers would ask people
if the party could count on their vote for the Democratic ticket.' 45 If they
said yes, they were asked if they could help turn out their neighbors by
being block captains. 146 The TDP then called the barrios 47 block by
block until volunteers found a captain for each neighborhood-three
hundred in all. 148 Each block captain was sent a packet of information,
campaign paraphernalia, a sample ballot, a clipboard, and the name and
139. Elizabeth M. Addonizio et al., Putting the Party Back into Politics: An Experi-
inent Testing Whether Election Day Festivals Increase Voter Turnout, 40 POL. SCI. & POL.
727 (2007).
140. Id.
141. STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOILIZATION, PARTICIPA-
TION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 209-10 (1993).
142. Telephone Interview with U.S. Rep. Solomon Ortiz (Feb. 13, 2008) (on file with
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues) (emphasizing that local campaign-
ing is essential to coordinating and winning an election).
143. Telephone Interview with Gilberto Hinojosa, Cameron County Democratic Party
Chair (Jan. 23, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. "Barrios" means "neighborhoods" in Spanish and is principally used to refer to
predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods.
148. Telephone Interview with Gilberto Hinojosa. Cameron County Democratic Party
Chair (Jan. 23, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
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address of every potential voter in their area. 149 Mr. Hinojosa then called
the block captains and encouraged them for a three-week period to talk
to their neighbors. 5 ' Some block captains did not follow through with
their commitment, but roughly sixty percent did. 15' A follow-up phone
bank was conducted to replace the inactive forty percent. 152 The TDP
followed the block captain program with a phone bank, as well as robo-
calls on the days immediately preceding the election. 53 The party also
sent one hundred people door to door in the barrios on Election Day,
targeting the same thirty precincts. 5 4 That year, Cameron County had a
forty-three percent turnout in the general election15 5-higher than it had
been since Bill Clinton ran for president in 1996.156 The downside is that
the operation cost nearly $55,000, which is more than many local party
organizations can spare.'
5 7
The block captain program is successful on many fronts, but Hinojosa
believes that one of the most important components to its success is its
ability to make voters less intimidated by the voting process. 5 8 Hinojosa
states, "You have people in the communities saying let's go vote, showing
them how to vote, taking them sample ballots, explaining to them how to
vote."' 159 However, "you have to have people who are willing to do it,
and to take their own personal time to do it.' 16 Once again, political
actors and the information they provide to voters are critical.'
16
North Carolina Early Vote Director Tony Rediger described a similar
strategy used in his state.' 62 The Obama campaign recruited "change
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Telephone Interview with Gilberto Hinojosa, Cameron County Democratic Party
Chair (Jan. 23, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
154. Id.
155. TEX. SEN. ELIOT SHAI'LEIGH. TEXAS BORDERLANDS 2009: DEMOCRACY'S FRONT
LINE 5 (2009), available at http://shapleigh.org/system/reporting-document/file/298/Voting-
Chapter.pdf.
156. Office of the Secretary of State, http://elections.sos.state.tx.uselchist.exe (select
"County by County Canvass Report" radio button; then select desired General Election
year from the drop-down menu and click "Submit": then select "President/Vice-President"
and click "Submit") (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
157. Telephone Interview with Gilberto Hinojosa, Cameron County Democratic Party
Chair (Jan. 23, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Telephone Interview with Tony Rediger. Early Vote Dir.. N.C. for Change (Dec.
12. 2008) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
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crews" of four volunteers who would train canvassers and phone bankers,
enter data, and essentially run the field operations for their designated
turf. 16 3 Each campaign field organizer oversaw four to eight change
crews, but the crews were essentially in charge of their own local opera-
tion, giving them ownership over campaign efforts.' 64 When community
members feel invested, they are more likely to stay involved between cy-
cles and for multiple cycles.
The high value of community organizing and the relatively low costs
associated with it in various situations make this a critical solution and a
central part of any effective TDP strategy in South Texas. We recommend
that it be implemented, regardless of the presence of a national or statewide
campaign, and we emphasize that it would be even less costly and more
effective if done through a TDP office in the region.
5. Legislative Action: Municipal Election Changes
Legislation sponsored by Democratic Representative Richard Ray-
mond, which would move election dates for municipal elections to the
same day as the general election, 6 5 would help address the incentives
problem. Because South Texans are so heavily invested in municipal
elections but are often indifferent to general elections, putting both elec-
tions on the same date would likely increase turnout.
The solutions within this category (TDP presence in South Texas, train-
ing local parties, sustained community organizing, and legislative action)
are meant to generate and maintain outreach by political actors that will
outlast the primaries in order to counteract the problems presented by a
lack of competitive races in the general election.
B. Encourage New Political Activity
The solutions in this section are intended to dilute the impact of fac-
tions and politiqueros by supporting new stakeholders who can help in-
crease turnout in South Texas. Currently, newcomers are hesitant to join
the political process because of perceptions of a culture of corruption. As
an outside organization, the TDP can lend legitimacy to efforts that
would include new actors in South Texas politics. There are two solutions
in this category: encouraging state and national campaign presence and
involving young people.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Bill to Move up the Primary Elections, http://blogs.chron.com/kuffsworld/2007/
01/bill to moveup-the-primary-el.html (Jan. 31, 2007, 12:13 CST).
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1. State and National Campaign Presence
The presence of state and national campaigns, a rarity in the region,
can play a significant role in motivating voters. Attention from these
campaigns can go a long way towards making voters in the region feel
appreciated, thus, making them more likely to participate in party politics
in the future because they will feel less abandoned.'6 6 This solution helps
to overcome both a lack of competitive races and dependence on local
political operatives for voter contact. Bringing in a campaign dramati-
cally increases the number of voters contacted, while saving the TDP re-
sources by sharing the costs of campaign activities.
Unfortunately, convincing state and national campaigns to invest time
and resources in South Texas can be an uphill battle, especially when they
are not invested in developing a long-term strategy for the region. The
TDP can only do so much to convince all statewide candidates to go to
the Valley; however, any competitive Democratic statewide or national
candidate will have to do so to win. Many campaigns will still maintain
that outreach in South Texas is too costly, but if the TDP develops more
of a presence in the region, as we suggest, it would be easier to convince
campaigns that the infrastructure is already in place and that running a
race in the region is viable.
Many voters in South Texas feel neglected by state and national cam-
paigns and would be thrilled to have the additional attention. However,
tensions could arise between state and national campaigns, which have
their own campaign strategies, and the local organizers, who are accus-
tomed to their own standard operating procedures. If campaigns plan to
conduct serious operations in South Texas, it is important that they begin
their efforts early in the campaign season so that tensions or disagree-
ments could be worked out well in advance of the final general election
campaign push.
We recommend that the TDP encourage competitive statewide or na-
tional Democratic candidates to have an early and consistent presence in
South Texas as part of a winning strategy.
2. Get Young People Involved
The TDP should recruit young people to weaken the influence of old,
entrenched factions. Young people in South Texas are an underused re-
166. Melissa R. Michelson, Meeting the Challenge of Latino Voter Mobilization, 601
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 85, 98 (2005) (explaining that Hispanic voters are
motivated to vote through personal, door-to-door campaigning). Michelson asserts that, at
a fundamental level, the key to increasing the Hispanic vote is "a simple matter of asking
for it." Id.
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source, which disadvantages both them and the Party. Their involvement
would not only add more manpower to the TDP's efforts, but would help
these young leaders build civic skills and become involved in their com-
munity. Reaching out to civic groups at local universities, such as service
fraternities and sororities and other community interest groups, is a good
first step. Edward Adrian Sandoval explains that members of these
groups are "already involved and already have an interest. When you're
disseminating information and doing outreach, you're targeting people
who are already organized, and it saves you a step."' 6 7 Because political
campaigns do not reach out to them often, Sandoval explained, many are
eager to have the opportunity to help.'6 8 Successful incentives to involve
these groups, he says, are twofold: "First, the fact that there is actually
outreach, and second, that there is free booze."' 6 9 But short of the occa-
sional free food or libations opportunity, the cost of recruiting new volun-
teers is low, and young people are often willing to work hours that older
volunteers are unable to offer.'7 °
Nathan Selzer discussed the importance of working with volunteers in
a way that makes them want to continue being part of organizing efforts:
"Sometimes campaigns think of volunteers with a use 'er up, spit 'em out
approach, but [Mi Familia Vota] tried to focus on the long term. We
wanted the immediate results of numbers, but we wanted something long
term to get the community involved and increase turnout in the Val-
ley."'' Victor Garza echoed the importance of building a volunteer cul-
ture in the Valley and of focusing on the quality, and not just the quantity,
of voter contact that each political actor accomplished.' 7 2
The TDP, in partnership with local party organizations, should reach
out to young people to help build a spirit of volunteerism in South Texas.
This solution is low-cost and will have a potentially high impact on voter
turnout.
167. Telephone Interview with Edward Adrian Sandoval, Former President, Univ. of
Tex. Pan Am. Student Gov't Ass'n (Mar. 13, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's
Law Review on Minority Issues).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. In addition to reaching out to student organizations, civic groups are also an
important source of campaign volunteerism. Id. Sandoval explains that, like student orga-
nizations, civic groups care about and want to change the community, but they are simply
waiting for a politician to ask them for their help. Id.
17t. Telephone Interview with Nathan Seizer, Project Coordinator, Mi Familia Vota
(Feb. 24, 2009) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
172. Telephone Interview with Victor Garza, Tex. Deputy Dir., Clinton Campaign
(Dec. 29, 2008) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
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These solutions (involving young people and encouraging state and na-
tional campaign presence) will help dilute the impact of factions and poli-
tiqueros by bringing in new political actors who can help increase turnout
in South Texas.
C. Oppose Discriminatory Legislation
Finally, we recommend that Texas Democrats actively campaign
against discriminatory legislation that has the potential to further disen-
franchise South Texas Hispanic voters. The pending voter identification
bill, for instance, saddles voters with the additional burden of carrying a
current photo ID and will likely deter voters-such as those in South
Texas-who have relatively limited resources. In addition, Texas Demo-
crats must also continue to oppose legislation that would terminate state
rules that require election materials to be provided in both Spanish and
English. Social and political circumstances already limit the number of
South Texans who vote in the general elections; the TDP must address
the legal barriers that have the potential to perpetuate this problem.
The TDP should continue to oppose discriminatory legislation that has
the potential to limit the ability of South Texans to vote in the general elec-
tions. This solution is critical to prevent legal barriers to the Hispanic vote
from further limiting the success of the TDP in South Texas.
V. CONCLUSION
Using data analysis, extensive interviews with local stakeholders, and
Rosenstone's and Hansen's theory, we find that the most important barri-
ers to turnout in South Texas are those that impact the incentives for
political actors to reach out to voters. These barriers exist in the general
election, both as a result of a lack of local competitive races and because
of entrenched political factions and operatives. High turnout in primary
elections in South Texas further illustrates that the problem does not lie
with the voters themselves.
Our proposed solutions to these problems are to engage South Texas
communities and to encourage new political activity. We believe that a
TDP regional office has the potential to be the most effective of our rec-
ommendations, particularly because it would make our other recommen-
dations easier to implement. In general, solutions that target the
motivations of political actors, not just voters, are much needed here.
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South Texas has been isolated based on assumptions that voters here
simply are not engaged in politics.' 73 Our analysis, which compares voter
turnout in the primary to turnout in the general, shows otherwise. In fact,
our analysis reinforces the argument that there is substantial untapped
potential here for Democrats. The TDP now has an opportunity to sub-
stantially reshape politics in South Texas before the 2010 elections and to
practice new and innovative methods of increasing general election turn-
out that would simultaneously build leadership capacity in the region.
Statewide and national elections depend on it.
173. Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back, TEX. OBSERVER, Mar. 21, 2008, at 20, avail-
able at 2008 WLNR 7075417.
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